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Abstract
Three recent reports on genetic screening published in the 
United Kingdom, Denmark and the Netherlands are 
discussed. Comparison of the Dutch report with the 
Danish and the Nuffield reports reveals that the Dutch 
report focuses on the aim of enlarging the scope for 
action, emphasising protection of autonomy and 
self-detenn ination of the sere enee more than the other 
two reports. The three reports have in common that the 
main concern is with concrete issues such as 
stigmatisation y discrimination 3 protection of the pnvate 
sphere and issues linked with labour and insurance.
Some potential long term consequences, however, tend to 
be neglected or underestimated. These omissions are 
pointed out.
In 1993 the Nuffield Council on Bioethics published 
a report., Genetic Screening: Ethical Issues >1 which has 
already been reviewed in this journal.2 Recently two 
other reports on genetic screening have been pub­
lished in Europe, a report by the Dutch Health 
Council, Genetische Screening (1994),3 and the report 
by the Danish Council of Ethics (1993), Ethics and 
Mapping of the Human Genome,4 This paper, being 
part of a BIOM ED project, EUROSCREEN I, 
compares and discusses the Nuffield report, the 
Dutch Health Council report and the Danish 
report.5 The following aspects of genetic screening 
will be considered: aims and benefits of genetic 
screening; conditions to be screened for; perceived 
risks and harms; education; economic considera­
tions; and the role of public authorities. Com­
parative analysis will be followed by a short 
discussion of some omissions.
Stated aims and benefits
The Danish Council of Ethics, discussing genetic 
screening against the background of non-genetic 
screening programmes, notes that in screening the 
help-motive has changed. There is a shift from the
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aim of treating, preventing and alleviating disease - 
an important goal of any screening programme - to 
the aim of offering the individual options. This 
second aim has become an important motive for 
genetic screening: help may mean offering informa­
tion that enhances choice and scope for action.6 7
This goal is given much emphasis by the Dutch 
Health Council. In their report a major aim of 
genetic screening is to enable people to decide upon 
a course of action that is acceptable for them. This 
aim of helping people achieve greater autonomy in 
the sense of taking more control of their lives is 
hammered home throughout the report.8 The shift 
from the aim of prevention and alleviation of suffer­
ing to enhancing autonomy comes out most clearly 
in the following passage: “Unless efficient thera­
peutical means are available to improve the quality 
of life of the person with the disorder, the purpose of 
screening lies especially in the use of the information 
for decisions about developing a relationship, repro­
duction, further development of life and determina­
tion of lifestyle” [authors’ translation] .9 The target 
clearly is the total life-situation of the individual, 
rather than the medical benefit.
This shift towards autonomy as an important 
target of screening is also apparent in the Nuffield 
report. Although the aim to improve the health of 
persons who suffer from genetic disorders seems to 
come first, 10 the report also points out that the 
benefits should be seen “as enabling individuals to 
take account of the information for their own lives 
and empowering prospective parents to make 
informed choices about having children” . 11 
Alleviating anxiety is a third important aim , 12 which, 
however* is less emphasised in the Dutch and Danish 
reports.
Screening may contribute to achieving distribu­
tive justice if it is offered to everyone. This objective 
does not get much attention in the three reports, The 
Dutch Health Council remarks that a genetic test 
offered to all may advance equal access to health 
services, but an offer to a group with an increased 
risk can be justified. Criteria will be required then, 13 
The Danish Council is also aware that screening 
gives many people a chance to gain a clear picture 
of potential disease. In  their view screening is a
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community-based form of help based on the obliga­
tion to help the weak.M However, this theme is not 
dwelt upon. The Nuffield report does not discuss it.
Condition
The Dutch Health Council leaves out of its guide­
lines the requirement that the condition screened for 
must be serious. 15 In an earlier report the health 
council said a restrictive list did not solve the indica­
tion problem. There they stressed that assessing the 
severity of a condition depended on personal factors, 
such as outlook on life and family size. 16 This view 
also seems to underly the council’s recent report: it is 
up to the individual and parents to determine 
whether a condition is serious enough to enter a 
screening programme. The Danish report also gives 
no specific guidelines concerning the severity of the 
condition to be screened for. 17 The Nuffield report 
does include the word serious in its requirements, 
but says that in the context of genetic screening it is 
difficult to define which disease can be considered 
serious, as perception of seriousness depends on 
treatment possibilities and may vary between soci­
eties. 18 Definition is also difficult because the 
severity of certain genetic disorders may vary greatly. 
This may be the reason why the three reports state 
that it is the individual who should eventuality 
decide whether or not to participate in a genetic 
screening programme.
Screening for common diseases with a genetic 
component is foreseen in the three reports. In the 
Nuffield and the Dutch report the need for further 
study of benefits and disadvantages is stressed. 19
i
i
s
Perceived risks
An important normative determinant of genetic 
screening is the potential harm due to the introduc­
tion of screening programmes. This may be harm for 
the person screened or others (relatives, offspring, 
handicapped people and society). First we focus on 
the potential harm caused by offering a genetic 
screening programme, after that we will discuss 
potential harm connected with participation, disclo­
sure procedures and use of information.
RISKS CREATED BY AN OFFER
The Nuffield report remarks that genetic screening 
may bring anxiety for the individuals screened, but 
notes that it may have wider implications, especially 
for families.20 According to the Danish report 
screening gives people a better idea of their risks, but 
the Danish council realises that an offer will threaten 
an individuals’s personal sphere and his/her right of 
autonomy and that consequences for other people 
must also be considered.21 The Dutch report mainly 
focuses on the risks and harms for the individual 
screened: an invitation to undergo screening will 
confront people with risks of which they are not
(fully) aware and this may cause anxiety.22 Anxiety 
may increase because there may be uncertainties 
about diagnosis and future development of the 
disease. An invitation to undergo screening may 
place people in situations of very difficult choices.23
RISKS CREATED BY PARTICIPATION
The Dutch report discusses at length threats to indi­
vidual autonomy and self-determination. Voluntary 
participation based on well-understood information 
is considered an absolute requirement for genetic 
screening and there must be safeguards for free 
individual choices during the whole screening 
process. Lack of adequate information may lead to 
misunderstandings and wrong decisions.24 In order 
to avoid any influence on decisions to participate 
much attention should be given to the form and 
wording of written information about the screening 
programme. Furthermore there is a danger that a 
counsellor’s personal views and motivation could 
exert pressure on the prospective participant. There 
is also the possibility of social pressure on the 
individual decision to participate.
Respect for autonomy also becomes manifest in 
concern for minors and the unborn: a disadvantage 
of genetic screening of minors is that it may threaten 
the future autonomy of the child as it can violate 
his/her right not-to-know.2“5 With regard to the fetus, 
the Dutch report remarks that “in prenatal screening 
the right not-to-know of the expected child can be 
frustrated if parents decide to continue the preg­
nancy in case of a serious incurable late-onset 
disorder” [authors’ translation].26 However, the 
right of a fetus to live with a (serious) handicap is not 
discussed.
Voluntary participation might also be threatened 
because of possible social implications. The Dutch 
Health Council realises that a duty to report findings 
of genetic screening when applying for a job or when 
trying to get life or health insurance may lead to 
pressure on the individual and to decreasing interest 
in participation. Possible stigmatisation of partici­
pants may also influence compliance.27
The Nuffield report, as well as the Danish report, 
does not discuss threats to autonomy at such length. 
The Nuffield report states that compulsion must be 
ruled out,28 and the Danish report remarks that a 
help offer should not intrude on the personal sphere 
and autonomy. Voluntariness, informed consent and 
confidentality are important requirements2^ and 
both reports are aware that fears of discrimination 
(by increased premiums or exclusion) may discour­
age people from taking parr in a genetic screening 
programme.3031
HARM CAUSED BY DISCLOSURE PROCEDURES
Screenees should be informed of the screening results 
and at present it is assumed that the information 
should be given non-directively. Also family members 
and relatives may be interested in disclosure of the
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genetic information. Difficulties will arise if a screenee 
refuses to give consent to pass on the genetic informa­
tion to relatives.
Much attention is given to protection of the 
autonomy and self-determination of the individual 
screened. The Dutch report emphasises that 
prospective participants in a genetic screening pro­
gramme should choose an option that fits in with 
their personal views, but they also observe that 
guidance is important.32 Counselling is considered 
especially important if the options are limited to ter­
mination of a pregnancy and the birth of a handi­
capped child. The council endorses professional 
advice and guidance.32 Here the position of the 
council seems a bit ambiguous as it is not made clear 
what is meant by “guidance” and “advice”, but it 
might be interpreted as a slight shift away from a 
very heavy emphasis on non-directive counseling in 
the 1989 health council report,
Non-directiveness in counselling at all stages of 
the screening process is also mentioned as an 
important requirement in the Danish and the 
Nuffield reports, but the Nuffield Council notes that 
in practice counselling is unlikely to remain com­
pletely neutral. In fact the council realises that a 
completely neutral stance may seem cold and 
unhelpful ,33 34
Disclosure of screening results to others, notably 
family members, may be quite difficult. Although 
the Dutch report notes that screening results may 
have implications for others35 and that this aspect 
should not be neglected when screening results are 
communicated, the Dutch Council does not discuss 
the implications of this. Instead, the council restricts 
itself to the observation that neither the influence of 
screening on relations with family members nor 
responsibilities concerning family, relatives and 
future children are clear. The council refers to the 
1989 report for its stance on disclosure of informa­
tion to others: consent of the person tested is needed 
for disclosure to relatives, If this consent is refused 
and if the screenee cannot be motivated to give 
consent the counsellor or physician is not allowed to 
disclose the information. The council admits this 
may occasionally lead to very difficult decisions on 
the part of the counsellor or physician who feels he 
has a duty to inform third parties to prevent serious 
harm to them. However, if they decide to disregard 
the refusal of consent, they should be able to justify 
their decision in court. On the whole this approach is 
very much on the side of individual autonomy and 
the protection of the personal sphere.30
Both the Danish and the Nuffield reports point 
out that genes are shared with relatives and that 
genetic screening can easily affect relatives of the 
persons screened.37 38 The Nuffield report, however, 
discusses this at some length. Individuals screened 
should be made aware of the implications for their 
relations. Information may be vital to the well-being 
or future life of other family members and it may be
appropriate to treat those family members 
as a unit and “to place less emphasis on individual 
patient autonomy” .39 The Nuffield Council even 
suggests persuasion as a strategy to minimise poten­
tial harmful consequences to family members.
HARM CAUSED BY USE OF INFORMATION
The choices based on genetic information vary 
according to the sort of screening test offered and 
include options with regard to reproduction, selec­
tive abortion and changing of lifestyle. We will focus 
here mainly on reproductive choices. Attention will 
be given successively to the individual or the parents 
who have to make difficult choices, the unborn child «  ^
with a detected genetic disorder, and social implica­
tions.
Carrier screening enables prospective parents to 
make informed choices about reproduction. One of 
the options is starting pregnancy in combination 
with antenatal diagnosis and subsequent selective 
abortion if the given disorder is detected. The 
Danish Council of Ethics notes that the question of 
abortion in connection with prenatal diagnosis will 
probably always be the subject of debate, but does 
not discuss the issue.40 The Nuffield report says the 
decision to terminate a pregnancy may be agonising, 
and that guidance is needed, but does not really 
discuss the issue either. Instead, results of some pilot 
studies are presented, showing the degree of accept­
ability of termination of pregnancy.41 Apparently 
both reports assume that the decision whether to 
have selective abortion after a positive test result is a 
matter for the individual parents. The Dutch report 
says the traumatic experience of termination of preg­
nancy should not be underestimated,32 but stresses 
the free and informed choice of the persons 
screened: “It cannot be emphasised enough that 
genetic screening has the aim to enable people with a 
disposition for disorders in which hereditary factors 
largely determine the development of a disorder, in 
themselves or in their offspring, to escape their fate 
by giving them the freedom to make an informed 
choice to adopt a course of action that is acceptable 
to them” [authors’ translation] .42 For the Dutch 
Health Council selective abortion is also a matter for 
the parents to decide and instead of consideration of 
moral aspects of selective abortion, this council too, 
presents data about acceptability of selective 
abortion in connection with certain hereditary 
diseases.43 In disagreement with the recently intro­
duced Population Screening Act, which does not 
regard selective abortion as a form of treatment or 
prevention, the council points out that selective 
abortion can be considered a relevant course of 
action in certain circumstances.44
Of course, it is not only the parents who are 
involved. Their decisions have implications for the 
unborn child, for example. However, the interests of 
the unborn child are not a matter for much discussion 
in the Dutch report, as it is apparently assumed that
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the parents are responsible for the decisions they 
make regarding reproduction. The presupposition 
seems to be that it is in the interest of the child to be 
aborted in case of a disorder that leads to a short life 
with serious and degrading suffering. However, the 
difficulties of assessing the severity of a condition 
during pregnancy and the quality of life expected are 
not considered. The Nuffield report seems to hold the 
same view. Carrier and antenatal genetic screening 
offer an opportunity to avoid both a child bom to suf­
fering and the lifelong emotional cost to the rest of the 
family in caring for a child in such a condition. The 
position of the Danish Council of Ethics on this issue 
is not discussed»45
With regard to possible social implications, the 
Dutch report notes that termination of pregnancy 
because of a genetic disorder might lead to dimin­
ished acceptance of people with a handicap. This 
would be a disastrous development, and it would 
also “threaten the free choice of prospective parents 
in such difficult decisions” ,46 It seems it is not so 
much the social implications that concern the 
council, but the pressure diminished acceptance of 
handicapped people may exert on individuals being 
screened. Freedom of choice is also threatened if 
inadequate care and attention is given to handi­
capped persons: lack of financial facilities to provide 
adequate services for the handicapped may lead to 
social pressure on the persons screened to choose the 
most advantageous option.47
Stigmatisation of persons and groups, with the 
possible consequence of more large-scale discrimina­
tion, is noted in all three reports. There are differ­
ences in the way these harms are assessed, however. 
The Danish report considers “branding” of 
handicapped people as utterly unacceptable. In the 
Nuffield report it is thought that proper educational 
programmes should reduce the risks of stigmatisation 
and discrimination.48 The Nuffield Council also notes 
that the availability of prenatal screening, together 
with the termination of seriously affected pregnancies 
may reflect and reinforce negative attitudes of our 
societies towards those with disabilities. Interestingly, 
the Nuffield report points out an inconsistency: on the 
one hand there is a great effort to care for and inte­
grate handicapped people in society, and on the other 
hand resources are also spent on preventing births of 
(severely) handicapped people,49
The Nuffield report is the only one which dis­
cusses the increasing risk of eugenic tendencies in 
society. The council realises that developments in 
genetic technology may lead to misuse for eugenic 
purposes, but the members of the council think this 
fear is unfounded, because the primary goal of 
genetic examinations and genetic screening is to 
help individuals and their families. Voluntary par­
ticipation and better public understanding of 
human genetics are considered as safeguards to the 
threat of eugenic abuse. Emphasis on informed 
consent, confidentiality and central co-ordination
and monitoring of generic programmes will also 
help in avoiding eugenic tendencies.D°
Education
With much emphasis on individual autonomy and 
free choice, informed consent is an important 
requirement in all three reports. Information is also 
needed for other purposes, however. In fact, educa­
tion of the general public is considered an important 
strategy to solve several ethical problems.
The Dutch Health Council expects that large- 
scale genetic information will diminish the risk of 
stigmatisation.01 Information will also bring 
adequate perception of and respect for handicapped 
people,52 it will help people to assess their risks 
better,53 it will diminish anxiety54 and it will diminish 
regret in case of non-participation and the birth of 
a handicapped child.54 Finally, education is thought 
to create solidarity with choices made by people 
screened.55
In the Nuffield report education is also seen as 
a major strategy for overcoming difficulties. 
Education is supposed to diminish misinterpreta­
tion, prejudice, stigmatisation and the danger of 
eugenics.56 The Danish report notes the impor­
tance of education and suggests what sort of infor­
mation should be included. Interestingly, both the 
Nuffield report and the Danish report suggest 
information about ethical aspects amongst the 
requirements,57 58 whereas the Dutch report is 
silent on this.
It is remarkable that in spite of a stated reliance on 
“adequate” information, the Dutch report says that 
in fact little is known about psychological conse­
quences of genetic screening. Also the effects on 
relatives and data generated about anxiety are 
unclear.59 Lack of information about consequences 
for self-image and about how people are able to cope 
with the screening results is also noted and the need 
for more systematic research on the consequences of 
termination of pregnancy and consequences of 
screening for late-onset diseases is pointed out.60 
This suggests that proper education cannot be 
expected in the near future.
Economic considerations
For the Danish Council screening is an expedient 
means of preventing costly treatment of disease, but 
it opposes the utilitarian approach suggested by the 
National (Danish) Board of Health’s report, as it 
feels that this approach is not widely supported in 
Denmark.61 The Nuffield report also states that 
benefits of genetic screening should not be calcu­
lated in purely financial terms, yet concludes at the 
end of the report that, in view of limited resources, 
resource costs and the relative priority of establishing 
a screening programme are factors that should be 
considered.62
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The Dutch Health Council also recommends that 
no emphasis should be placed on cost-benefit 
analyses, as these may be a threat to individual 
decision-making - emphasising money savings as a 
benefit of genetic screening may lead to undesirable 
social pressure to participate in genetic screening 
programmes, compromising free choice.63 There is 
no discussion of the costs of screening programmes 
in the context oflimited health care resources.
Role of public authorities
Except for the role of public authorities in connec­
tion with legislation for the use of genetic data and 
tests for employment, pension funds and insurance, 
there is little information about the role of public 
authorities concerning genetic screening within a 
health care context in the Danish report. The 
Nuffield Council suggests a central co-ordinating 
body that should undertake a review of genetic 
screening programmes. The Department of Health 
should take the lead in formulating detailed criteria 
for introducing genetic screening programmes into 
routine practice, says the report, and it should review 
genetic screening programmes and monitor their 
implementation and outcome.64
In the Dutch report we find the most extensive 
discussion about the role of public authorities: in the 
Netherlands genetic screening falls within the scope 
of the Population Screening Act of 1992 (enacted in 
1996), which requires that the minister approve 
screening programmes before they are implemented, 
having been advised by the health council. A licence 
is refused if a screening programme is scientifically 
unsound, if it conflicts with the statutory regulations 
or if it involves risks for the prospective participants 
that outweigh the likely benefits. The rules for popu­
lation screening to detect serious diseases or abnor­
malities which cannot be treated nor prevented 
should be very tight. It is realised that these require­
ments may create problems if genetic screening is 
concerned with reproductive decisions. The council 
is of the opinion that screening programmes which 
may be followed by prenatal diagnosis and selective 
abortion are acceptable. With regard to employment 
and insurance, the Dutch Council notes that self­
regulation is not sufficient and that legislation will be 
required if new forms of uninsurability arise.65
Discussion
Examination of the Dutch, Danish and Nuffield 
reports reveals great concern for autonomous 
decision-making, protection of the personal sphere 
and potentially harmful consequences of genetic 
screening for individuals. This is perhaps most 
clearly so in the Dutch report. In the Nuffield report, 
which seems to reflect most the attitudes of the 
medical profession, a greater consideration for the 
interests of others, notably family members and
relatives, is apparent. However, instead of sum­
marising similarities and differences here once again, 
we may perhaps point at some omissions in the three 
reports.
1 There is some un clarity about the aims of genetic 
screening programmes in the three reports. Although 
they all point out that there may be important 
medical benefits, especially for treatable disorders, 
enhancement of autonomy and enlargement of scope 
of action has also become an important objective. 
Prevention or reduction of suffering are traditional 
goals of medical practice. Enhancing wellbeing by 
offering reassurance has also become common 
practice. This may make genetic screening for these 
purposes acceptable. Less clear is whether the 
enhancement of autonomy, as propagated especially 
in the Dutch report, should have such pride of place 
as an objective of medical practice. If autonomy is 
instrumental in the prevention of suffering of individ­
ual or family this goal seems defensible. If autonomy 
in the sense of giving people more control of their 
lives is the aim, the question of whether this is an 
acceptable aim of medical practice, especially if 
compared with other urgent health needs and limited 
health care resources, should be considered.
2 In  genetic testing on request it is the individual 
who decides if a condition is serious in his or her 
particular situation. Can this approach also be used 
when introducing a large-scale genetic screening 
programme? The requirement in the English and 
Danish reports is that the condition to be screened 
for should be serious. In the Dutch report this is 
given less emphasis. It is unclear in this report who 
is to define a condition as being serious enough to 
justify the introduction of large-scale genetic testing. 
Is it the individual, the medical profession, the com­
munity, or a combination of these - or is it a private 
company, which will simply put a genetic test on the 
market for financial benefits?60 It is also unclear what 
criteria will be used to establish the severity of a 
disease. If, as seems likely, it becomes increasingly 
easy in the future to screen for desirable and unde­
sirable traits, and for severe and mild genetically 
based diseases and susceptibilities, we may well be in 
need of further criteria or guidelines. These may 
perhaps not only be in the interest of a future child 
(in the case of prenatal screening), but they also 
seem important for health and life insurance and the 
funding or reimbursement of genetic tests and 
screening programmes.
3 In the reports selective abortion is presented as an 
acceptable way of preventing suffering. Although it 
seems difficult to prohibit an individual or couple 
from having an abortion for genetic reasons if the 
law permits abortion on request, the question should 
perhaps be considered whether by offering genetic 
screening programmes for untreatable diseases at a
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population level selective abortion is not institution­
alised as an accepted form of medical practice. 
Institutionalisation may bring the danger of setting 
quality standards for acceptable and unacceptable 
forms of human life.
4 A tendency is noticeable, more so in the Dutch and 
English reports, to fall back on pilot studies which 
provide statistical material about compliance 
numbers, acceptability for the target group and will­
ingness to terminate a pregnancy in case of an 
affected fetus. Here a consumer-oriented approach 
becomes apparent: if a sufficient number of people 
seem interested a screening programme can be 
introduced. In combination with an approach that 
favours individual autonomy there may be a danger 
that neither moral reasoning nor carefully developed 
criteria or guidelines, but the market, will decide 
whether a genetic screening programme will be 
introduced. In that case it will be difficult to control 
potentially harmful long term consequences, such as 
slowly changing attitudes towards reproduction or a 
growing demand for optimum quality babies. It is a 
problem the President’s Commission for the Study 
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
Research notes: “The choices made by many inde­
pendent individuals form new societal norms that are 
not the conscious creation of any one person. These 
in turn may not only impose significant limitations on 
people’s choices in the future but may also alter basic 
societal attitudes and presumptions” .67 The Nuffield 
report notes a potential for eugenic misuse,68 but is 
confident that genetic education will greatly reduce 
this danger. However, it is perhaps not the govern­
ment policy prescribing minimum standards of 
quality of life which is a threat, but eugenic tenden­
cies growing from below. Without further criteria 
regarding the conditions to be screened for, but with 
increasing possibilities for commercial genetic 
screening and testing in a society where the consumer 
decides what is acceptable, an increasing number of 
parents may start thinking in terms of minimum 
standards of quality of life for their future children. 
Hard evidence for this cannot yet be provided as we 
may be only at the very beginning of such a develop­
ment. We believe such a development to be not 
wholly hypothetical, especially in a society where 
abortion on demand is a possibility and where 
persons with health problems tend to be seen as 
interfering with efficiency and profit.
Table Summary of points of agreement and differences
Aims/benefits
Condition
Perceived risks 
Offer
Participation
Disclosure scrcenee 
Disclosure relatives
Use of genetic information
Reproductive decisions 
Education
Economic considerations 
Role of public authorities
Danish Council of Ethics
Emphasis on individual health 
benefits
Enhancement of choice 
Health problem 
Guidelines difficult
Threat to personal sphere and 
autonomy
Implications for other persons 
Individual/social pressure 
Social implications may reduce 
participation
Intrusion of personal sphere 
Directiveness
Refusal to pass on genetic
information
Conflict of interests
Discrimination
Stigmatisation
Abortion issue not discussed
Adequate informed consent 
needed
Financial benefits do not have 
priority
No discussion of 
commercialisation of genetic 
screening
Government control to manage 
social consequences
Nujfieid report
Emphasis on individual health 
benefits
Enhancement of choice 
Serious health problem 
Guidelines difficult
Creates anxiety 
Implications for families
Individual/social pressure 
Social implications may reduce 
participation
Directiveness, but non­
directiveness potentially unhelpful 
Refusal to pass on information 
Conflict of interests 
Mild persuasion recommended
Discrimination 
Stigmatisation 
Diminished acceptance of 
handicapped people
Difficult decisions: guidance 
needed
Adequate informed consent 
needed
Prevention/reduction of potential 
harmful social consequences
Financial benefits do not have 
priority
No discussion of 
commercialisation of genetic 
screening
Coordinating body formulating 
criteria
Dutch Health Council
Emphasis on enhancement of 
choice
Medical benefits 
Health problem 
Individual decides
Creates dilemmas 
Creates anxiety
Individual/social pressure 
Social implications may limit 
participation
Misinterpretation of information 
Directiveness
Refusal to pass on information 
Conflict of interest 
Emphasis on protection of 
private sphere 
Discrimination 
Stigmatisation 
Diminished acceptance of 
handicapped people threatens 
free choice
Difficult choice: parents decide
Adequate informed consent 
needed
Prevention/reduction of 
potential harmful social 
consequences 
Little information on 
psychological and social 
consequences
Financial benefits not major 
consideration 
No discussion of 
commercialisation of genetic 
screening
Population Screening Act in 
force.
Legislation needed to control 
social consequences
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